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A Long-Term Concern:
Repealing the Rule Against Perpetuities
-by Neil E. Harl* 
 We seem to be encountering all manner of unpleasant developments these days – bad 
weather, low commodity prices, disagreement in politics, the threat of rare infections and 
on and on. Some are comparable to what was encountered in our younger years and some 
appear, at least, to be targeting today’s population. But one, in particular, seems to be yoked 
with actions that, at first blush, looks harmless but may be the most disruptive in the long 
run.
Rule Against Perpetuities
 The culprit was the repeal (or substantial amendment) in 31 states of a rule inherited 
from 17th Century England—repeal of the Rule Against Perpetuities.1 The case involved 
disagreements among the heirs of the Duke of Norfolk over the propriety of leaving property 
in successive life estates. The disabled youngest son objected to his father leaving his 
substantial property to his eldest son for his life, then the second son for his life and then 
the youngest son outright. The youngest son argued that his disability probably meant that 
he would succumb at a relatively young age and inherit nothing and that successive life 
estates could well mean that he would die before his brothers and inherit nothing. The court 
agreed which set the stage for limits on how long property could be held in successive life 
estates.
The United States version
 That meant that property could not be held in successive life estates forever in the United 
States. In many states, the limit was that property could not be held longer than a class of 
selected lives plus 21 more years. In many of the states, the Rule has come to stand for 
the proposition that interests must vest, if at all, not later than 21 years after the last to die 
of a class of lives in being at the creation of the interest.2
 All of the states had similar rules in place until the Governor of South Dakota broke 
ranks and convinced his legislative body to bring a halt to the Rule in the early 1980s. 
Pushed by competitive pressures, 31 states have either repealed the Rule or substantially 
amended it. Those amending the rule in most instances stretched the time property could 
be held. 
 The effect is to tie up real estate forever, which essentially prevents real property from 
being drawn into higher economic returns. That has a negative effect on economic growth. 
______________________________________________________________________ 
* Charles F. Curtiss Distinguished Professor in Agriculture and Emeritus Profes sor of 
Economics, Iowa State University; member of the Iowa Bar.
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now, the two beneficiaries would have increased to 3.4 million 
individuals.
 Finally, the issue of control is important. The property would 
likely be administered by some nearby city today. In 500 years, it 
might not even be administered on this planet.
The key question 
 Do we want to place our economic system at risk with such a 
short sighted move? 
END NOTES
 1 Duke of Norfolk’s Case, 3 Ch. Cas. 1, 22 Eng. Rep. Case, 3 Ch. 
Cas. 1, 22 Eng. Rep. 931 (Ch. 1682) (the case concerned, Henry, 
the 22d Earl of Arundel, later the Duke of Norfolk).
 2 See Iowa Code §558.68(1) (2017).
 3 L.M. Simes, “The Policy Against Perpetuities,” Univ. Of Penn. 
L. Rev. 707 (1955). Available at http://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/
cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=7723&context=penn_law_review
 Professor Lewis Simes, a well-known legal scholar of his era, 
articulated two reasons for the Rule in contemporary society – 
“First, the Rule Against Perpetuities strikes a fair balance between 
the present generation, and similar desires of succeeding, to do 
what they wish with property which they enjoy. . .. In a sense this 
is a policy of alienability, but it is not alienability for productivity. 
It is alienability to enable people to do what they please at death 
with the property which they enjoy in life.” Simes goes on to state 
“But in my opinion, a second and even more important reason 
for the Rule is this. It is socially desirable that the wealth of the 
world be controlled by its living member and not by the dead.”3
 I would add a third reason for preventing ownership forever 
– “it is an article of faith that economic growth is maximized if 
resources are subject to the forces and pressures of the market. 
Prices emanating from free, open and competitive markets are 
the best way to allocate resources and to distribute income if 
economic growth is to be maximized.”
 Another factor is the large numbers of beneficiaries over time. A 
recent study calculated that if a couple with two children acquire 
property in 2017, with normal fertility levels, 500 years from 
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 CONVERSION.  The debtor originally filed for Chapter 13 
and had been paying on the Chapter 13 plan for two years before 
converting the case to Chapter 7. The Chapter 7 trustee moved to 
dismiss the case as abusive under Section 707(b). The trustee argued 
that the debtor’s disposable income exceeded the means test of 
707(b)(2)(A)(i). Section 707(b)(1) provides that: “After notice and 
a hearing, the court, on its own motion or on a motion by the United 
States trustee, . . . may dismiss a case filed by an individual debtor 
under this chapter. . . if it finds that the granting of relief would be 
an abuse of the provisions of this chapter.”[Emphasis added] The 
formula in Section 707(b)(2)(A)(i) provides that a presumption of 
abuse never arises where a debtor’s disposable monthly income 
is less than $128.33; that it always arises if such income is more 
than $214.17; and, if such income is within the range of $128.33-
$214.17, the presumption arises only if the debtor’s non-priority 
unsecured debt exceeds a specific sum. The issue was whether the 
language in Section 707(b)(1) italicized above, refers to the original 
Chapter 13 petition or the conversion to Chapter 7. The court held 
that the Congressional intent of Section 707 was to limit the ability 
of debtors with sufficient income to avoid post-petition payments to 
creditors in Chapter 7. Thus, it was inconsistent with such intent to 
allow a Chapter 13 filer to circumvent the limitation by first filing 
in Chapter 13, which does not have a means-test, and then convert 
to Chapter 7 without meeting the Section 707 means-test. Thus, 
the court held that the debtor was prohibited from converting to 
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Chapter 7. Pollitzer v. Gebhardt, 2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 11394 
(11th Cir. 2017), aff’g unrep. D. C. dec. aff’g, 2014 Bankr. LEXIS 
4729 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2014).
 FEDERAL ESTATE
AND GIFT TAXATION
 PORTABILITy.  The decedent died, survived by a spouse, on a 
date after the effective date of the amendment of I.R.C. § 2010(c), 
which provides for portability of a “deceased spousal unused 
exclusion” (DSUE) amount to a surviving spouse. The decedent’s 
estate did not file a timely Form 706 to make the portability election. 
The estate discovered its failure to elect portability after the due 
date for making the election. The estate represented that the value 
of the decedent’s gross estate was less than the basic exclusion 
amount in the year of the decedent’s death including any taxable 
gifts made by the decedent. The IRS granted the estate an extension 
of time to file Form 706 with the election. Ltr. Rul. 201724002, 
June 19, 2017; Ltr. Rul. 201724003, June 19, 2017; Ltr. Rul. 
201724004, June 19, 2017; Ltr. Rul. 201724011, June 19, 2017; 
Ltr. Rul.  201724014, June 19, 2017; Ltr. Rul. 201724019, June 
19, 2017; Ltr. Rul. 201724020, June 19, 2017.
